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Abstract: 
Normativity matters in international politics, but IR scholars will benefit from dereifying 'norms' as 
units into a relational, configurational alternative. The alternative I propose here is the 'normative 
confliction': an arrangement of ongoing, interacting practices establishing action-specific regulation, 
value-orientation, and avenues of contestation. This responds to recent constructivist scholarship, 
particularly from relational sociology and practice theory, that implies the need for ontological and 
analytical alternatives to 'norms' as central concepts responsible for establishing rules, institutions, 
and values in social life. I offer a way of conceptualising and analysing normativity consistent with 
these alternative approaches. Namely, I have brought together a pragmatist theory of action with the 
social theories of a number of key relational social theorists and philosophers, oriented around a 
reading of what norms talk actually does for social enquiry. This yields a concept I call the 'normative 
configuration'. I then outline a three-stage process—dereification, attributing agency, and tracing 
transactions--that allows scholars to study transformations in normative configurations. Finally, I 
discuss what this contributes to the recent turns towards practices and relations, as the latest direction 
in constructivist scholarship within the discipline 
 
 
Much mainstream constructivist research in IR frames explanations in terms of 
norms (McCourt 2016; Hoffmann 2010), approached as widely held rules about right 
action, to account for puzzling phenomena in world politics. However, what 
scholars call ‘norms’ are rarely consistent, singular social things, instead comprising 
entangled, often internally inconsistent arrays of practices and standards, undergoing 
ongoing revision and contestation by the people enacting them. To talk of norms 
may thus be problematic, or at least analytically unhelpful, when those arrays of 
practices and principles are unsettled, in unusual internal tension, or undergoing 
rapid evolution as a result of internal or external pressures. Put differently, if rules, 
values, and institutions are changing fast, and it is not clear why, an explanation may 
2 
 
 
come only by focusing on a heterogenous array of social processes rather than some 
agglomeration of the same into ‘norms’, old and new. 
As contemporary ethno-nationalist movements seek to reframe politics 
across the global north, by challenging and recalibrating their normative 
orientations, these effects are especially important. These challenges, and challengers, 
span different contexts and have different agendas, but collectively they may trigger 
the evolution—or erosion—of a host of long-standing arrangements in hugely 
consequential ways. In these situations, observers may see rapid transformations in 
the status and content of what is right, proper, desirable, and authoritative, and yet 
be unable to easily identify whether this the change of a norm, the replacement of 
one norm with another, or the simple erosion of a norm. 
Consider three examples of recent United States security policies. The use 
of ‘enhanced interrogation’ methods appears to many observers to be a case of 
torture,1 and thus a violation of the prohibition thereon (McKeown 2011; Panke 
and Petersohn 2011)—in other words, ‘norm violation’ and perhaps even ‘norm 
death’. Yet proponents of those methods did not, and to this day do not, claim that 
the prohibition on torture is illegitimate, or that it was in their case acceptable to 
engage in torture. Rather, they claim that their methods were not transgressive—
that what they did was not torture at all (John Rizzo, interview with author). To refer 
to this as a case of norm violation or erosion thus means passing judgement on the 
validity of this claim, substituting methodological fiat for an anthropologically 
sensitive investigation into what involved actors actually were contesting or seeking 
to transform. A similar dynamic may be seen in the multinational rise of private 
military and security contractors in warzones: while some scholars claim this is a 
violation of a norm prohibiting mercenarism (Petersohn 2014), practitioners 
themselves are adamant that these contractors are not mercenaries (Christopher 
Mayer, interview with author), and that mercenaries continue to be rightfully 
excluded from conflict zones (Avant 2016). Again, the same dynamic appears in 
considering whether the use of drones to engage in targeted killing, now a staple of 
US security policy, constitutes a violation of a prohibition on assassination. Those 
 
1 Including, when ‘off the clock’, this author. 
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behind the development of the targeted killing programme argue that it does not, 
not because no such prohibition against assassination should exist but rather that 
assassination is just not the same thing (Pratt 2018). To claim that these are cases of 
norm change or violation requires scholars to take an a priori position on the very 
issue of political controversy they are researching—for to argue that a prohibition 
is being overturned is not an evaluatively neutral stance. Moreover, these cases 
feature the gradual improvisation and institutionalisation of new technical and 
professional skills and standards, in ways not just captured by the idea of 
contestation over what a rule or principle implies. Clearly something is normatively 
different, but the features of the cases make it hard to express this difference in 
norms-talk. 
If a scholar cannot easily distinguish between these possibilities, and is 
instead confronted with a fluctuating tapestry of practices and principles, it becomes 
unhelpful to analyse changes through the language of norm emergence, cascades, 
and other such norms-talk common in the field—all of which, explicitly or tacitly, 
treats norms as units and thus requires discrete norms be denoted, often in advance 
of analysis. Attempting to do so risks dividing institutions and actions up in ways 
that are not reflected or respected in practice, obscuring how putatively similar 
norms can mean different things depending on time and place. Moreover, an 
increasing body of scholarship in the field oriented around practices and relationality 
is inconsistent with the ontological treatment of norms as distinct social objects, and 
in many cases has avoided discussion of norms altogether (Jackson and Nexon 1999; 
Adler and Pouliot 2011; see also McCourt 2016). This yields accounts of thoroughly 
normative things—values, conventions, customs, and cultures (and transformations 
thereof)—detached from those constructivist conversations focused on how norms 
drive outcomes in IR.  
To address these problems, this article draws on pragmatist and relational 
social theory to provide a new ontology of normativity, as a package of causes and 
effects in international politics, meaning forces that both shape outcomes and are 
themselves outcomes, undergoing maintenance and transformation alike. I offer an 
alternative concept in place of the norm: the normative configuration, defined as an 
arrangement of ongoing, interacting practices establishing action-specific regulation, 
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value-orientation, and avenues of contestation. All ‘norms’ are normative 
configurations, and while analytical benefits can and have accrued from their 
‘arrestation’ (Jackson and Nexon 1999) into the concept of norm, these benefits are 
contingent upon historically particular case features. Scholars should also be able to 
break norms down into their constituent, moving relations—de-reified—and 
explore their normativity itself as the outcome of particular kinds of practices and 
processes that may be rearranged in a wide range of ways. 
            I begin by examining how scholars have approached norms and normativity, 
tracing the analytical strengths and limits of their concepts. I argue that IR norms 
scholarship has mainly studied how norms emerge and change. However, by treating 
norms as discrete objects, it has approached them epidemiologically: as traveling and 
evolving packages of moral information. This reifies important dimensions of social 
action and interaction responsible for establishing normative force; that is, it takes 
multiple processes of action and interpretation and gathers them into fixed units. 
On examination, these processual factors are central to implementing and 
embedding normative valuation or force in particular practices and institutional 
arrangements. While missing from most theoretical formulations, I find this 
relational and processual account already tacitly at work in recent constructivist 
research. Indeed, it has been a fertile basis for establishing a robust research 
programme—one virtually definitive of the positive constructivist project in the 
field. Nevertheless, I argue that there is good reason to develop an alternative 
concept, provide that alternative can fulfil certain conditions. 
The second part of the paper details the alternative. Drawing on pragmatist 
and relational social theory, I develop ‘normative configurations’ as a concept for 
understanding how normativity operates and changes. I proceed by examining what 
social theories of norms exist to do, analytically or ontologically, and what an 
alternative to them should therefore also do. On the basis of this synthetic reading 
of social theory, I base normative configurations on four ‘wagers’: that normativity 
is embedded in action (rather than being distinct from it); that normativity provides 
both ends and means for action (rather than providing only ends); that normativity 
links ends and means recursively (rather than ends influencing means but not vice 
versa); and that normativity crystalises into institutional arrangements through the 
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stabilisation of practices (rather than through practice-independent discursive or 
formal constitutive processes). Together these wagers can orient investigations of 
normative influences and changes without referencing the movements or life cycles 
of norms. 
Third, I outline a three-stage methodological procedure for examining 
changes in normative configurations over time: dereification, attributing agency, and 
tracing transactions. This approach lets one break an apparent rule, principle, or 
value down into its component relations and processes, determine where 
contestation or weak institutionalisation generates locations of instability, and track 
unfolding mechanisms of transformation. I situate this procedure within existing IR 
projects to develop practice-centric methods of analysis. 
In a final section, I discuss how my proposed approach fits with the 
sympathetic projects of existing relational and practice-focused IR scholars. In 
particular, I argue that the approach to normativity and action developed here is 
consistent with the practice and relational ‘turns’, while contributing to them a 
potent vocabulary for studying normative transformation. Perhaps most notably, it 
offers the prospect of greater synthesis of mainstream (that is, norms-focused) and 
critical constructivism. It makes the theoretical goods and themes of the norms 
research programme ontologically tractable to those working from relational and 
practice-theoretic approaches, while also introducing the critiques offered by those 
approaches to the broader community of norms scholars. 
 
IR and the Norms Research Programme 
Normativity interests scholars across the social sciences and humanities. The 
concept of ‘norm’, in various forms, enjoys widespread currency not just in 
sociology and political science, but in philosophy, psychology, economics, and 
anthropology, carrying a range of overlapping meanings, both within and across 
these fields.2 Broadly, ‘norms’ may refer to values, mores, conventions, identities, 
 
2 In psychology, ‘norms’ refer both to conventions of ethical conduct that shape individual 
behaviour (Dubois 2003) and to cognitive categories into which information may be sorted 
(Kahneman and Miller 1986). In moral philosophy, a ‘norm’ is usually a rule of conduct carrying 
moral force, and there is a robust debate over the epistemic and ontological status of norms as 
such (Von Wright 1963; Searle 1995). Economists and rational choice theorists treat ‘norms’ as 
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classificatory schema, shared expectations of behaviour, and associated practices 
(Moore 1956; Cancian 1975; Bicchieri 2005; Elster 2009), shaping actors’ moral 
opinions and featuring in processes of socialisation and social regulation. 
The study of norms has also been a central preoccupation of constructivist 
IR scholars. Scholars sought answers to the question ‘what do values, principles, and 
rules do in international politics?’ The history and direction of this research 
programme can be understood in terms of waves. The first wave, mainly spanning 
the 1990s and early 2000s, brought the concept of norms, as a way to account for 
normativity, to a discipline otherwise consumed by rationalist debates over the 
comparable merits of neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Hoffmann 2010). The earliest 
of this literature (see, among others, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, Kratochwil 1989; 
Nadelmann 1990; Finnemore 1996a; 1996b; Barkin and Cronin 1994; Katzenstein 
1996) sought mainly to establish the salience of a normative dimension to the 
conduct of international politics. At the forefront of the first wave of this research 
programme were major studies into the emergence and spread of prohibitions, such 
as on nuclear weapons (Tannenwald 1999), chemical weapons (Price 1995), and 
slavery (Keck and Sikkink 1998). By the end of the 1990s, scholars had developed 
complex models of norm ‘life-cycles’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and of the 
reasons why some norms endure while others disappear or fail to become prominent 
in the first place (see, among others, Klotz 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Bernstein 
2000; 2001).  
The second wave, beginning in the early 2000s, partially de-reified norms, 
and attended to their dynamic nature more fully than the scholarship of the first 
wave. Actors themselves played a more prominent causal role, contesting and 
interpreting norms rather than passively internalising them through processes of 
socialisation (Acharya 2004; Cortell and Davis 2005; Sandholtz 2008; Wiener 2004; 
2008; Krook and True 2012; Wiener 2004; 2008; 2009; Hofferberth and Weber 
2015). Scholars of this wave studied norm change at a finer resolution, temporal or 
institutional, of analysis, whereby a single norm may be interpreted or manifested 
 
determinants of interests and thus of preferences (Axelrod 1986; Fearon and Wendt 2002), or in 
functionalist terms, as means of coordinating social action, either intentional or as the unintended 
and emergent result of collective social interactions over time (Opp 2001; Elster 1989). 
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differently across social time and space. In this literature, norm change arises out of 
a temporary settling of ongoing contestation and interpretation, which, this work 
argues, can arise out of anything from a significant shift in institutional culture to 
executive imposition. Wiener (2009) offers the most articulate direct theorisation of 
norms here, advising scholars to focus on ‘meaning-in-use’, contingency, and to 
focus on the ‘micro-level…settings of interaction’ (178). Hofferberth and Weber 
(2015) propose something similar, arguing that norms be approached through an 
‘interpretive’ methodology (75) whereby they serve as sense-making and linguistic 
devices. However, contextualising norms in this way still retains problems of 
reification. When norms are entirely products of interpretation, they become the 
epiphenomena of ‘cultural practices’ (Wiener 2009, 181) or are otherwise simply 
focal-points of discourse, and when they are treated as causes or as features of social 
structures with their own qualities, they do not differ from the ‘norms-as-units’ 
ontology underlying first wave norms scholarship. In other words, the turn towards 
contestation and interpretation may dereify norms, but only by relinquishing the 
robust causal role normativity can play outside of discourse. 
The recent work of Wiener, Hofferberth and Weber, and others studying 
norms in a similar way reflects increasing, though still limited engagement or 
convergence with critical constructivist research. Critical constructivists, taking after 
Kratochwil (1989) and Onuf (1989) rather than ‘soft constructivism’ (Wendt 1999), 
have long examined discursive processes of normative interpretation (Epstein 2008; 
Towns 2012), but their work has largely remained on the margins of more 
conventional norms research—in a sense, as part of ‘the constructivism that wasn’t’ 
(Jackson 2012). They have studied the ways interpretation and practice establish the 
ends and ethics of the conduct of world politics, but not how one norm may come 
to replace another, spread throughout the international system, and influence state 
conduct—the processes of greatest interest to the first wave. 
The most recent scholarship on norms still struggles to make room for 
agency, usually understood as some personal capacity for moral judgement and 
autonomy of action, without reducing its object to processes of interpretation alone 
(Bucher 2014). Perhaps the most sociologically sophisticated of this work is that of 
Schmidt’s (2014) pragmatist theory of norm change. He aligns with the relationalism 
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proposed by Hofferberth and Weber (2015) but assigns norms a role in practice that 
goes beyond cognition and discourse. By identifying a norm with a practice, then 
providing a theory of how practices transform that defines the normative 
implications thereof, he concretises norm change in a way that considers 
contestation and interpretation (for all practices undergo these things) but also 
agency (as the capacity of people for flexibility in action and judgement), and opens 
a theoretical door for a range of sociological perspectives on practice to contribute 
in new ways to the IR literature on norms. Pragmatist philosophy and social theory 
provide the conceptual basis for this identification, but Schmidt does not explore 
them to their full potential. First, he retains a more or less one-to-one relationship 
between a norm and its referent practice, which makes it harder to grasp shifting 
and often inconsistent arrangements of practices and principles, in ways that may 
not admit of neat reduction or translation. Second, the ‘mechanism’ of norm change 
Schmidt proposes does not explain why any one particular norm has changed, 
because it is a general theory of action—it is meta-theory, describing how any 
practices changes, regardless of case. What it instead does is direct attention towards 
the dynamics of creativity, relationality, and evolutionary (rather than revolutionary) 
revision of what is normative. 
The different strands of norms scholarship thus embrace a sort of 
ontological duality.  Early work, employing a definition still in use in plenty of 
empirical work today, approaches norms as reified social objects: ‘standard[s] of 
appropriate behavior for actors’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 891), possessing both a 
subjective and inter-subjective dimension (Hoffmann 2010), respectively shaping 
actors’ moral opinions and featuring in processes of socialisation and social 
regulation. Norms are features of the social world that guide people in how to live 
and make up the context for much of their life in the first place, and thus are discrete, 
causally efficacious ‘things’ (Krook and True 2012) that can feature in claims of 
cause and effect. To be sure, scholars have recognised that norms do not float freely, 
but are enmeshed in a given context. Finnemore, for example, avers ‘the importance 
of viewing norms not as individual ‘things’ floating atomistically in some 
international social space but rather as part of a highly structured social context…a 
fabric of interlocking and interwoven norms rather than individual norms of this or 
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that’ (1996a, 161). Nevertheless, by orienting analysis around specific norms, both 
in theory and in practice, the ultimate result is atomistic. Norms still end up existing 
as traveling units of moral information, embodied in social and psychological form, 
influencing the course of things.  
Conversely, critical constructivists and some second-wave norms scholars 
approach norms as points of discursive contestation or orientation, which avoids 
reifying them but also significantly constrains their potential role in explanations of 
change—here ‘norms’ change, but there are no consequences to this because they 
are the outcomes of underlying processes of interpretation. Rather, a change in a 
norm indicates that something else has changed, discursively or hermeneutically. In 
other words, the choice is between reification, to atomistic units, and reduction to 
other social-theoretic categories. 
To be sure, many cases of institutional transformation involve breaks from 
the past, or revolve around distinct rules, principles, or values so pronounced and 
obvious in substance that they can be (and have been) productively explained 
through norms-talk. However, some cases of transformation, because they are 
uneven or internally inconsistent, span a heterogenous set of practices, or are the 
outcome of a range of agendas and instruments, do not admit of neat division into 
old norms, new norms, norm entrepreneurs, and discourses of contestation 
revolving around the interpretation of a discrete standard or value. 
Yet these kinds of cases are of great interest to relational and practice-
theoretic IR scholars, whose focus on institutionally situated processes of evolution 
or transformation proceed from a more micro- and meso-level sensitivity to agency 
(see McCourt 2016; see also Adler and Pouliot 2011; Jackson and Nexon 1999). 
Moreover, when relational IR does take a macro-sociological perspective, it does so 
often with attention to the dispersed and plastic nature of values and conventions 
(see, for example, Linklater 2011; Nexon 2009), further limiting the usefulness of a 
‘norms-as-things’ ontology, compared to one in which norms are de-reified into 
configurations of processes and relations of interaction. Indeed, relational and 
practice-theoretic IR research has thus largely left behind norms research for this 
reason (McCourt 2016), for lack of an ontologically commensurate, analytically 
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more helpful approach to norms and normativity. In the next section, I address this 
by proposing one such approach. 
 
From Norms to Normativity Configurations 
I propose a concept better suited to tracing complex processes or practices 
establishing normativity and generating transformations: the ‘normative 
configuration’. It escapes the predominant deontic or ‘logic of appropriateness’ view 
(March and Olsen 1998), whereby ‘norms’ serve as the cognitive underpinnings of 
rule-following or morally-driven action, provide ends or direction based on values 
(Hofferberth and Weber 2015; see also Parsons 1937). Nor does it treat norms as 
emergent patterns or instrumentally established coordination principles, as 
rationalists do, in ways that offer no traction, by definition, on the obvious ethical 
character of many empirical cases.3 These views are caught between the ‘upward 
conflation’ of voluntarism and a ‘downward conflation’ of over-emphasising the 
determining properties of structure (Archer 1995; see also Loyal 2003), and obscure 
a heterogeneous array of social processes in which agency is distributed and change 
is inconsistent yet common. Drawing from pragmatist and relational social theory, 
I suggest an alternative that better captures the pathways of social regulation, how 
normativity is involved in the constitution of social arrangements and orders, and 
the reciprocal interplay of morality and instrumentality in action. It reveals the 
constellations that make it possible for normativity to fluctuate without constituting 
an episodic or self-evident change in institutionalised conventions. 
The alternative I suggest builds on a small but potent set of existing 
criticisms of the norms research programme. By placing situated creativity and a 
processual view of social relationships at the centre of this approach, I join with 
Hofferberth and Weber (2015) and with Wiener (2008; 2014) in tracing the multi-
dimensionality and interactivity of normative dynamics. Indeed, Hofferberth and 
Weber (2015) themselves propose many of the theoretical moves that I argue for 
here, drawing on pragmatist theories of action (Joas 1996) and relational sociology 
 
3 For example, Morrow (2014) explores the origins of restraint in war as reciprocal, self-interested 
agreements between parties, acknowledging throughout that these agreements (and responses to 
violations thereof) are backed by strong moral sentiment, but does not need or want to account for 
it his theory. 
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(Emirbayer 1997; Jackson and Nexon 1999) to try to access the dynamic processes 
of innovation and social interaction that constitute norms. However, by still 
retaining the concept of ‘norm’ as an entity in their theory, leave opaque the complex 
social relations establishing normativity as a causal force, and focus on 
interpretations of the norm in question, rather than on the practices out of which 
the appearance of stable and singular norms emerge. Building theories around concept 
of the normative configuration goes beyond purely interpretive methods by locating 
the causal potential of normativity and of the forces that drive normative change. 
 
The normativity of action 
I propose that normativity exists within action. For constructivists, acts carry an 
implication of propriety—of their own goodness or rightfulness. In other words, 
almost nobody consciously does something without also thinking that there is a 
compelling or justifying reason for it, and those habits and practices that we perform 
without conscious thought are conditioned by learned standards of propriety.  When 
an action is to any degree self-aware, it is joined with normative judgement and 
claim. Conversely, action, when aggregated and arranged in certain ways, provides 
the generative and disciplinary force for normativity in social orders in general. In 
this sense, so-called ‘norms’ are not substantive objects in the world but momentary 
snapshots or settings of the ‘rules of the game’, anchoring social understandings and 
values for both scholars and their subjects alike, but open to transformation as 
‘players’ continually renegotiate and reinvent them. Beneath seemingly settled 
regimes of human rights, sovereignty, and cooperation are a fractal of nested 
deliberate and accidental revision of practices and institutions, for status, for 
efficiency, or principle. Normativity is established, enforced, and interpreted by 
ongoing processes of social interaction.4  
This view grants normativity a pervasive and persistent role in the ongoing 
creation of society and subjects alike, as that aspect of action that goes beyond the 
purposes of the individual actor, and establishes seemingly independent or 
 
4 For a range of helpful relational perspectives on processes of institutional transformation and 
normative contention, see Depélteau 2013, Fligstein and McAdam (2012), McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly (2001), and Emirbayer (1997). 
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impersonal sources of meaning, value, and justification. If this is the case, 
normativity can only be understood alongside and through a more general theory of 
action, in which the normative and non-normative aspects of action are clearly 
defined and related to one-another. Normativity is a dimension of action, but so too 
is instrumentality, and moreover, normativity is both an ‘objective’ and forceful 
feature of the social world actors must account for in their strategies and habits, and 
a ‘subjective’ orientation towards particular values and ends. This yields a puzzle: 
how do we describe potential for self-reformation and world-transformation 
definitive of agency, without neglecting the dispositional role that values and 
meanings play, both by orienting action around particular ends and by supplying a 
repertoire of known means? Or, put most simply, how are creativity, as the capacity 
to invent new worlds, and sociality, as the orientation towards meaningful collective 
life, knit together in practice? 
Ultimately, this question can be answered only with a general theory of 
action. Yet this is a fractured and long-standing project,5 and all positions lead to 
difficulties in accounting for all dimensions of normativity. Most theories of 
action—from Weber and Parsons to Goffman and Bourdieu—offer either an 
undersocialised (overly voluntaristic) or an oversocialised (overly deterministic) 
account of normativity. First and obviously, instrumental theories of action, such as 
those underpinning rationalist approaches (for example, Olson 1965; Elster 1989) 
explicitly sanitise action of normativity, and are thus inadequate for studying 
normativity as a causal force. This is why, for example, Morrow (2014) may explain 
the instrumental dynamic of reciprocity in military adherence to the laws of war, but 
lacks any account of why actors may feel it is right, proper, or humane to do so. 
Second, action theorists may taxonomise action into analytically distinct categories 
that provide traction on some cases but abstract increasingly far from human 
experience, or grant a normative dimension to only some acts.6 This is precisely what 
 
5 For a full review of the range and history of action-theorising in social theory. See Joas and 
Beckert (2001). Here I only touch upon a few significant aspects of that project. 
6 Weber does this with his famous typology of action. While ‘value-rational’ action, oriented around 
some principle of right conduct irrespective of the actor’s ends, attends to normativity, ‘purposive-
rational’ action does not, because it is wholly instrumental pursuit of ends, free of any 
consideration as to the boundaries of propriety (Habermas 1984). Weber’s third type, ‘practical 
action’, features only a pseudo-normative dimension, as it refers to habits that actors initiate and 
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occurs when, in IR, a ‘norms-based’ or ‘ideational’ explanation is seen as competing 
with a rationalist or ‘material’ one, as if actions could be exclusively one or the other. 
Together, these two problems obtain in the bulk of action theory,7 and they make it 
hard to give an action-centric account of normativity. 
The way around these problems lies in pragmatic or practice-focused strands 
of theorising on action—in particular the approaches taken by Erving Goffman and 
Pierre Bourdieu. Goffman’s studies of communication focus on its role in ‘strategic 
interaction’: game-like engagements between two or more parties in a ‘well-
structured situation of mutual impingement where each party must make a move 
and where every possible move carries fateful implications for all parties (1969, 100-
101). While this view may at first sound overly instrumental, a careful examination 
of Goffman’s central concept of the ‘interaction order’ shows that it pays 
considerable attention to normativity (Goffman 1983). Normative commitments 
enable the strategic element of communication, as an essential component of the 
social terrain and a source of leverage upon all actors (Goffman 1959, 1969). This 
approach explains a great deal about how even subordinate participation 
interactions entails recognition and agency—such as through managing their stigma 
(Adler-Nissen 2014) or in diplomatic ‘pecking orders’ (Pouliot 2016). However, 
while it does weave together normative and instrumental dimensions to action, it 
cannot account for the genesis and transformation of values. This is partly due to a 
steadfastly micro-sociological focus, but also because Goffman’s interest is in 
theorising communicative exchanges rather than institutions, sparing him the need 
to navigate the problems of action theory more generally. In other words, Goffman 
shows the value of situated, performative views of action, but his approach is too 
‘presentist’ to explain processes of change over time. 
Bourdieu, who does theorise institutions, provides another promising angle 
on normativity in action: socially conditioned actors reproducing culture through 
 
perform without deliberation or calculated forethought (Kalberg 1980).6 Parsons’ appropriation of 
Weber rendered all action normative, but only by subordinating it to the functions of the holistic 
social system, dissolving agency entirely (Giddens 1979; 1984). Habermas’s theory of 
‘communicative action’ (1984)6 is (explicitly) a more pragmatic synthesis, but it still retains the 
Kantian bifurcation of the normative and the instrumental found in Weber, making it impossible to 
analyse the mutual implication of moral and strategic factors. 
7 On this, see Joas (1996). 
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habituated practices, situated in and oriented by a field of power relations between 
subjects (Bourdieu 1977, 1993). This explains how actors develop values but may 
also change them, through manoeuvres that alter the contexts cultural production 
and economic competition (1993)—for example, by exploiting diplomatic alliance 
structures to build support for controversial interventions (Adler-Nissen and 
Pouliot 2014). The critical disadvantage of Bourdieu is the strictly constrained self-
awareness he assigns his actors, which does not allow for deliberate and self-
conscious action; actors engage only tactically, and never consider or seek to change 
the broader social conditions generative of subjects in the first place (Bohman 1999; 
Margolis 1999; Depelteau 2013). In other words, Bourdieu knits together 
normativity and instrumentality, accounts for order and history,8 but does so by 
curtailing the liveliness and potential for self-awareness in action. In a sense, then, 
both Bourdieu and Goffman capture normativity in action, but from two opposing 
and incomplete perspectives; the former presents an over-socialised view of actors 
and the latter neglects socialisation processes altogether. The result in both cases is 
a view of action inadequate for the task at hand, but which is nevertheless 
instructive.  
The strengths and limitations of Goffman and Bourdieu suggest how best 
to theorist normativity in action. Both theorists ‘externalise’ normativity, treating it 
as a feature of the environment in which action takes place. In other words, 
Bourdieu’s field and Goffman’s interaction order describe the institutionalisation of 
normativity without reifying it into discrete and autonomous social entities. At the 
same time, both miss the bidirectional constitution between ends and means, 
meaning that actors, in their theories, lack the deliberative capacity to act upon 
themselves as well as simply on one-another. Yet this sort of self-reformation is an 
evident feature of a number of historical cases,9 and by treating it as a potential 
outcome of all action, both determinism and voluntarism can be avoided. Moreover, 
 
8 For a sustained examination of Bourdieu as an historical sociologist, see Gorski 2013. 
9 One notable example would be the emergence of a Jewish national identity, and, eventually, of a 
Jewish national state. Another would be the rapid emergence of a Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian 
ethno-nationalisms during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Beyond nationalism, theological 
reformations leading to holistic reorganisations of the polity and the political subject, such as the 
Protestant Reformation, might also qualify. 
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that possibility is also essential to most normative theorising, as a society incapable 
of reflection upon the good has limited horizons of transformation. 
 
A pragmatist view of action 
Pragmatism offers a way to theorise normativity in action that does not suffer from 
the problems of those other approaches surveyed. A pragmatist theory of action 
begins not with wilful actors, nor with the dispositional properties of social 
structures, but with a certain kind of relation: the transaction. Acts are transactions 
between the body, or organism, and its physical environment, stimulated by 
impulses shaped by evolution but underdetermined in their expression (Dewey 
1983, 117–118). The term ‘transaction’ here refers to arrangements of unfolding 
processes which cannot be specified apart from one-another, extending in time as 
well as space, and which, in the case of the organism and its environment, deny the 
independent pre-existence of either one (Dewey and Bentley 1949, 137). Acts 
ground human behaviour and perception, and establish human experience as an 
‘organized context of meanings and activities’ (Alexander 1987, 133). In other 
words, acts are what knit things together, and they create the conditions for the 
emergence of mind and for the definition of world. 
Acts are often routinised. Dewey uses the term ‘habit’ for acts that take place 
with little conscious reflection, as ‘an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of 
response’ (Dewey 1983, 32), which (contingently) manifests in similar though not 
identical acts across social time and space. But habits are more than simply 
expressions of acquired dispositions. They are part of the environment in which the 
organism lives and acts: they are ‘situational structures rather than individual 
reflexes, psychic associations, or repeated actions’ (Alexander 1987, 142). As a form 
of action, habits possess ‘causal efficacy’ as both a medium and an outcome of 
ongoing organism-environment transactions. They are part of a relational process 
of adjustment to the contingencies of experience, and generate both self and world. 
Habits, however, are not always sub-intentional or unconscious, and can be 
subject to modification. When habit is interrupted or inhibited, the organism must 
select from a wide range of mutually exclusive responses. The way by which it does 
so is through reflective self-awareness, from the consideration and selection of 
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alternatives (Hildebrand 2008, 28–30). Thus, unlike in theories of practice or habit 
where action lacks conscious intentionality, in pragmatism action moves in and out 
of self-awareness, and cognition occurs at both levels. 
This approach rests on a peculiar theory of mind: that it exists in the doing 
rather than as a distinct faculty applied to action and decision as needed. In Dewey’s 
own words:  
[Mind] never denotes anything self-contained, isolated from the 
world of persons and things, but is always used with respect to 
situations, events, objects, persons and groups…Mind is primarily a 
verb. (my emphasis; Dewey 1987, 268) 
Put more simply, action is what produces minds because minds are actions: they are 
ongoing processes of reflection and habit-modification, directed at coping with the 
inhibitive or indeterminate features of the world. For humans, mind is therefore 
social, because we live in a world of other people. 
This philosophical foundation makes possible a pragmatic view of agency—
not as something made specifically possible by structured relations of enablement 
and constraint but arising from an inherent human capacity for continual 
innovation. Agency does not refer to a capacity of individual persons to act with 
freedom or flexibility, but of action itself to change the world. In other words, 
agency is the power of action, rather than the power for action. That capacity receives 
its expression in the relationship between action and its ends: 
[New] goals will arise on the basis of newly available means.…This 
reciprocal process between means and ends structures action. It 
anchors the notion of goals firmly in the action process itself and 
argues against the external setting of goals as advocated in 
teleological theories of action. This allows one to perceive perception 
and cognition not as acts preceding action but as part of the action 
process that is inherently connected to the situational context. (Joas 
and Beckert 2001: 273) 
Thus a pragmatist view of agency refers to the ongoing adaptive process, where 
organisms become agents by acting within an environmental context that both 
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circumscribes and constitutes them, establishing creative possibilities for dynamic 
subjects constituted by action and changing along with it. 
A pragmatist focus on evolving transactions covers both the creativity of 
action and the way it is shaped, oriented, and directed by historically determined, 
institutionalised social settings, imposing pressures and offering opportunities. The 
process of inhibition and reorientation of habit explains both how normativity 
persists in familiar forms and also how it may change rapidly in form or content. It 
grants actors the possibility of significantly reinterpreting their goals and obligations 
without denying the value-laden nature of both. Yet it lacks a well-specified theory 
of the social environment; the pragmatist view of action focuses on the capacities 
of the organism to adapt, but does not offer any clear way of describing the 
institutional settings in relation to which adaption occurs, nor of grasping political 
struggle between persons and groups. In the next sub-section, I suggest a way of 
doing so. 
 
From action to the normative configuration 
By analysing social arrangements through the lens of pragmatist action theory, a 
certain conception of their normative dimensions emerges: the concept of the 
normative configuration. It refers to the same kinds of things that scholars have called 
‘norms’ and their effects, but it replaces that vocabulary with an alternative on—for 
new language often carries with it new sensitivities and opportunities for novel 
theories. Normative configurations are arrangements of ongoing, interacting 
practices establishing action-specific regulation, value-orientation, and avenues of 
contestation. In other words, they are processual, heterogenous, and provide both 
ends and means to actors, by directing action towards the attainment of particular 
outcomes and by treating certain kinds of symbols and performances as 
authoritative. Not every arbitrary assortment of practices constitutes a normative 
arrangement by this definition, but every practice is necessary part of one, as 
normative arrangements provide direction and cultural depth to social life. Hence 
the task for the investigator is to find which practices come together to generate a 
particular set of regulative outcomes, and to study in particular their normativity-
producing dimensions. 
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This definition rests on four ‘wagers’—propositions about the dimensions 
of normativity distilled from the foregoing discussion of action and the social world. 
First, as normativity inheres in the action process, the mechanisms of normativity 
are the ways it features in evolving transactions linking actors to one-another and to 
their worlds. Second, as normativity provides subjects with ends, with means, and 
with the symbols, performances, and social skills through which to link the latter to 
the former, it inscribes or institutionalises culture into the action environment. This 
allows it—an outcome of action—to in turn become a component of subsequent 
action. Third, normativity enables the recursive transformation of ends and means. 
It orients action around certain ends but also makes possible ethical transformation, 
as ends are rarely consistent, featuring competing imperatives and values-in-tension 
which must be resolved through creative problem-solving. Fourth, normativity 
crystalises into institutional regimes. This is what enables observers to speak of 
seemingly enduring ‘norms’. Collectively, these wagers provide a meta-theoretical 
approach the understanding what normativity is and how it works, and provide a 
basic analytical architecture for examining historically specific processes of social 
change. 
I base these wagers on an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of a 
number of relational and practice theorists who wed their theory of action with one 
of social order. Pragmatism implies that social arrangements are not only an 
outcome of organism-environment transactions, but feed back into the 
environment itself, and thus are part of a recursive process that generates actors as 
fully-fledged subjects. Moreover, because action is a process, it has a history and a 
boundary (Rescher 1996); it has physical, temporal, and conceptual edges that give 
it presence in space and time. A range of broadly relational social theories already 
speak to this in various ways, from the capillary operations of power/knowledge 
discussed by Foucault (1980), to the practice-oriented synthetic social theory of 
Giddens (1979; 1984; in IR, see Steele 2008), to the Marxian-inspired agent-structure 
co-determinism of critical realism (Bhaskar 1998; Archer 1995; in IR see Wendt 
1987; Wight 2006). Yet not all such approaches are equally sympathetic to a 
pragmatist analyses of normativity. Indeed, all three of those listed examples offer 
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comparatively limited space for the situated and reflexive creativity key to 
understanding normative transformation.  
However, other views of normativity can extend pragmatist theorising 
beyond the immediacy of action. They approach the world as neither a cohesive 
whole nor an epiphenomenon of individual agents, but a structured configuration 
of transactions, generating both the action environment and the social material 
constituting actors as subjects imbued with dispositions and capacities. The four 
wagers draw from the agreements, strengths, and weaknesses of the more prominent 
of these approaches. 
Wittgenstein’s notion of the ‘language game’ envisions a practical, ongoing 
series of communicative interactions governed by rules but underdetermined by 
them (Wittgenstein 1958). Language games are bundles of practices and habits, and 
their form generates both the player and the ‘rules of the game’ alike. Yet because 
rules must be interpreted, there is always room for creative revision, and thus 
language games feature continual, dynamic transformations of the conventions that 
define them and the actors that play them. This suggests a view of social settings as 
plastic, horizontally distributed interchanges of rule-following performances, in 
which action is normatively oriented but retains creative and interpretive features 
(Winch 1958; see also Schatzki 1996). Goffman’s work on communicative 
interaction, while not based on a reading of Wittgenstein, is nevertheless an excellent 
example of the sociological implications of thinking in terms of something language 
games. 
Reading Wittgenstein as a theorist of normativity offers a key lesson: action 
is lively and the rules or institutions that form out of it are never ‘out of play’. The 
more robust they seem to be, the more interaction must be oriented around their 
maintenance. But while Wittgenstein alludes to a defined and historically embedded 
normative setting arising out of action, he misses the institutional and causal 
dimensions of normativity. The fluidity and multiplicity of language games, and the 
prioritisation of hermeneutic explanations for changes in behaviour, leave little 
room for theorising politics as genuine struggle in a world of competition and 
constraint, and thus a Wittgenstein’s approach is sociologically limited. 
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Another helpful view comes from Bourdieu—not just in his capacity as a 
theorist of action, but as a theorist of social order. Bourdieu has enjoyed a recent 
renaissance amongst IR scholars, for whom he has offered a potent means of 
theorising the habitual, embodied, and localised communities of practice that 
constitute key international institutions (Pouliot 2010; Bigo 2011), the dispositional 
metaphysics of power (Guzzini 2013), and much of the foundation for the ‘practice-
turn’ that has more generally taken shape in the field (Adler and Pouliot 2011; 
Bueger and Gadinger 2015). His concept of the ‘field’, by which he means a social 
space made up of asymmetrical relations of power and exchange, envisisions an 
objective domain in which the artefacts of culture are produced and in which actor-
positions of advantage are captured, defended, secured, contended, and expanded 
(Bourdieu 1984). Since Bourdieu put ‘fields’ to use in a range of now-famous 
analyses of a wide range of spheres of institutional and cultural life, other 
sociologists have developed the concept further. In a major recent book, A Theory 
of Fields, Fligstein and McAdam offer the following concise definition of the concept: 
a ‘mesolevel social order in which actors…interact with one another on the basis of 
shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the 
field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and 
the rules governing legitimate action in the field’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 1).  
This definition suggests what ‘fields’ bring to a consideration of normativity, 
and also what limits their use for analysing normative transformation. Like the 
concept of the language game, ‘fields’ describe a structured normative context for 
action: as an ordered terrain of social life comprising opposing institutional and 
economic positions, it accounts for the constitution of actors and action 
possibilities. Actors’ manoeuvers and stratagems establish new cultural materials and 
new pathways for future such actions, enabling the normativity of action to work as 
a transformational force. However, the concept has two salient limits. First, because 
‘fields’ are constitutively arranged around struggles for domination and supremacy, 
they feature a thin notion of normativity seemingly based on a quasi-instrumental 
view of action. Actions appear cynical, and lack the aspirational creativity that drives 
normative transformation on the pragmatist view. Second, transformations in fields 
are temporally detached from transformations of actors themselves; while a 
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changing field should feature changing subjects, the two processes do not need to 
occur with any immediate reciprocity—and indeed, a key argument Bourdieu 
advances in a number of cases is that actors may possess a form of subjectivity ill-
suited to life in their field (Bourdieu 1984; Steinmetz 2013). Hence, while the 
concept of ‘field’ offers clues as to how to conceive of the cultural and institutional 
dimensions of normativity in action, it is not adequate for analysing normative 
transformation—at least not without significant revision. 
Norbert Elias offers final insights. He shows how changes in personal 
psychological make-up; subjectivity recursively supports and is supported by 
broader institutional arrangements in society (Elias 1994). At the core of this is his 
concept of a ‘figuration’: an interwoven complex of individuals living within a form 
of life, ‘characterized by socially and historically specific forms of habitus, or 
personality-structure’ (van Krieken 1998, 52–53). Stable figurations not only 
condition actor identities, but also sustain the action environment, making politics 
possible in the first place: ‘At the core of changing figurations—indeed the very hub 
of the figuration process—is a fluctuating, tensile equilibrium, a balance of power 
moving to and fro, inclining first to one side and then to the other’ (Elias 1978, 131). 
Social arrangements also play a dual ontological role, as both sources of subjectivity, 
as packages of values and dispositions, and as structured environments of resources 
and constraints. In IR, Linklater (2011) has made us of Elias’s approach in a major 
study of the history of the cosmopolitan harm principle, and it is not hard to see 
how similar studies might be produced of other normative features of international 
politics that range individual emotions to major institutions—such as national 
identity and protections for children in cases of trafficking or conflict. 
There are two lessons in Elias’s approach that inform the conception of 
normativity I advance. First, that are both continually transforming and entangled 
within a similarly transforming array of broader institutional and cultural relations. 
Second, that both subjects and their words exhibit transactional dynamicity even 
though they are beholden to without power and domination in history. Its weakness, 
however, is an under-specified relationship between action and the constitution of 
these subjects and worlds. In other words, and unlike with Wittgenstein and 
Bourdieu, it is hard to connect Elias’s approach to the way normativity empowers 
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practice. Yet by reading Elias in concert with them, the synthetic understanding I 
propose should appear sound, and it should be apparent how it fits within the 
broader agenda of both action theorists and those studying the causes and effects 
of ‘norms’. 
 
Analysing Normative Transformations in Three Stages 
In order to identify how a particular normative transformation of interest took place, 
I propose a three-stage analytical process: de-reification, attribution of agency, and tracing 
transactions. Many elements of this are already present in the discipline, in mapping 
out where norms sit within a set of institutions, identifying opportunity structures 
and agents or ‘entrepreneurs’ of norm change, and tracing how they go about 
mobilising. Indeed, I retain these elements by design, both because that makes it 
easier for norm researchers to adopt and also because those researchers have in 
many ways implicitly grasped the need to de-reify their objects of study, even if their 
ontological vocabulary does not fully allow for this. The novelty here is a systematic 
approach for organising analytical procedures around representing heterogeneous, 
interwoven practices, in arrangements of sympathy and tension, rather than 
summarising them as singular objects, and showing how these arrangements 
fluctuate. This distills the insights of relational and pragmatist theory into a better-
specified methodological framework for case analysis. 
In de-reification, the researcher disaggregates the ‘norm-like’, defined by 
historical place as well as regulatory function, into its components. This stage 
recognises that what motivates an investigation of normativity is often the apparent 
presence of what scholars have previously called ‘a norm’: some clear social 
agreement on a rule, value, principle, or institution, as something stable enough and 
coherent enough to influence the conduct of actors and be noticed by scholars. Yet 
instead of identifying this point or process of consensus as a ‘norm’, scholars instead 
represent it as a normative configuration—as the institutions, actors, means, formal 
and informal regulations, and practices generating stability in normativity over time. 
Notably, this should yield more than just an assortment of discourses; it should 
mean indexing a form of life. This also identifies points of tension, where problems 
of implementation or disagreement may spark innovation and transformation, along 
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with the media through which sources influence and interact with the broader 
relational field in which they are situated. 
De-reification shares much in common with the mapping of fields of 
structural and semiotic relations (Bourdieu 1993; Epstein 2013; Pouliot 2007), along 
with the identification of actors and specialised structures of institutional 
governance (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Examples of skilful normative de-
reification by IR scholars include enquiries into cosmopolitan views on harm 
(Linklater 2011), the foundations of human rights in Israel (Krebs and Jackson 
2007), and the challenges presented by war crimes allegations to Turkish and 
Japanese identity (Zarakol 2010)—all marked by an attention to process and to 
relational analyses. Simply put, this stage means identifying the who, what, when, and 
where of a given case of normative transformation.  
The second stage, attribution of agency, draws from the pragmatist and 
relational view that agency emerges out of transactions between organisms and their 
environments (Emirbayer and Mische 1998; see also Latour 2005). The premise here 
differs from the approach taken in most research on norms of treating agency as 
something actors have, and instead looks for agency in situations with a propensity for 
change. This is a necessary move when the objects of investigation comprise a 
distributed arrangement of actors all capable of revising their actions, but not all 
afflicted with the will to do so, even if opportunities could be found or made. 
Moreover, it recognises that agency is not just actors altering situations, but also 
altering themselves, and thus cannot be assigned to any one kind of thing (like an 
‘entrepreneur’ or an organisation). 
Attribution of agency involves locating and specifying transactions most 
likely to drive a normative transformation of interest. The scholar must look at a 
normative configuration and mark out points of contestation, technological 
innovation, or organisational openness—the places where processes of normative 
transformation are most likely to emerge. On a pragmatist and relational view, 
attribution of agency is also ‘agency detection’—a systematic establishing of who 
and what was instrumental in driving certain changes. Moreover, it is testable, and 
if it is incorrect, it will not be possible to complete the third stage of the analysis. 
This provides methodological room to consider a range of competing explanations, 
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and to examine whether they specify causal processes that can, plausibly explain the 
observed normative transformation. 
Several traditions of institutional analysis all feature agency attribution, albeit 
not per the pragmatist approach. Historical institutionalists examine exogenous 
shocks as destabilising influences, identifying situations of crisis and actors with 
ambitions for change, the combination of which establishes the conditions for 
transformation (Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Steinmo 2008). IR scholars studying the 
rise of new prohibitionary regimes in the wake of the Cold War (Nadelmann 1990), 
for example, relate major upheavals to new space for normative change. Complexity 
theorists study non-linear forms of interaction and thresholds at which small 
changes in particular interactions can lead to large changes across an entire system 
(Mitchell 2009), generating interesting transformations (Byrne 1998; Jervis 1998), 
such as in warfare (Bousquet 2008) or global climate governance (Hoffman 2011). 
Finally, practice theorists do not just map fields but also identify kinds of practices 
or types of practitioners with unusual transformative potential (Schatzki et al 2001; 
Adler and Pouliot 2011), though indicators of rising pressure, friction, or 
institutional weakness. Though a pragmatist approach will focus specifically on 
sources of situated creativity, attributing agency is an established methodological 
technique, able to fit within a range of analytical frameworks. 10 
The third stage, tracing transactions, is a form of ‘process tracing’: ‘the analysis 
of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for 
the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms 
that might causally explain the case’ (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 7) What 
distinguishes it from investigating how specific actors contest, interpret, or 
propagate ‘norms’ it is the focus on reciprocal re-constitution; that is, searching 
within strings of transactions for the ways actors transform, with each iteration 
leaving the situation and everyone involved a little different than before. It 
emphasises the embeddedness of actors within their own dilemmas, such that both 
are transformed through situated action. For the study of normative transformation, 
 
10 Other approaches with an existing presence in IR include network analysis (Hafner-Burton et al 
2009) and actor-network theory (Walters 2002, though see also Nexon and Pouliot 2013). 
Constraints of space limit deeper engagement with them, however. 
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this offers one important benefit: it reveals how existing prohibitions can be ‘side-
stepped’ not by changing what is prohibited but by transitioning out of given 
institutional category of regulated actor, with the ultimate effect being a new 
relationship between a rule and the conduct of those supposedly bound by it. 
 
Normative Transformation, Practices, and Relations 
The theory of normative transformation I offer here is explicitly built around 
practice and relationality—both subjects of recent ‘turns’ in the discipline. I argue 
that it is better suited to practice or relation centric approaches than are mainstream 
theories of ‘norms’, because it is ontologically consistent with their premises. Yet 
there already exists research in the practice and relational turns focusing on 
normative change without making use of the conceptual vocabulary of norms 
scholarship. Mainly this tackles large-scale historical transformation featuring 
changes not only in which conventions, rules, principles, and values are extant but 
also in how they are woven together in practice. In other words, there are periods 
of meta-normative transformation too lengthy or multidimensional to be easily 
narrowed down to contestation or entrepreneurship over specific ‘norms’. The 
gradual emergence and elaboration of a cosmopolitan notion of harm, and of harm-
reduction as a moral principle, is one such example (Linklater 2011). Another is the 
emergence and management of self-other relations between China and the nomadic 
communities of the Inner Asian steppe, producing normative categories and their 
maintenance in practice (Mackay 2016). A third is the emergence of a relatively stable 
set of identities and relations across religious divides (and their associated territories 
and institutions) in Europe, which occurred through intense social movement 
contestation (Nexon 2009). All trace the causes and effects of particular 
constellations of principles, rules, authorities, and values—the stuff of ‘norms’—but 
avoid foregrounding norms in their analytical apparatuses. 
 Moreover, practice-turn-associated scholars have also recently set forth 
configurational approaches able to perform some of the same analytical work as the 
approach I propose here. Vincent Pouliot recently combined Bourdieu’s field theory 
and Goffman’s theory of the interaction frame in a study of diplomatic ‘pecking 
orders’ (2016). Emanuel Adler’s forthcoming book (2019) sets forth a theory of 
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‘cognitive evolution’ mobilising process ontology to explain transformations in 
epistemic communities of practice. These two examples suggest that my own 
proposal is in good company, but also is consistent with a broader trend. 
 Yet a theory of normative transformation in particular adds value to the 
practice and relational turns in a number of ways, all generally a result of 
reapproaching the ends and interests of the norms research programme in new 
ontological terms. First and foremost, it conserves one of the most significant 
achievements of constructivist IR to date: the reified view of norms itself enabled 
the de-reification of other key institutions and assumptions taken for granted by 
neorealist and neoliberal IR scholars, as part of the constructivist critique (McCourt 
2016). This is not an irony; it is an illustration of the explanatory virtues of gathering 
together and concretising dispersed processes and relations, in cases where doing so 
makes tractable clear transformations in the objects of our investigation. While 
treating norms as real objects with essential features is a fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness, establishing their conceptual relevance, whether through reification or 
analytical ‘arrestation’, made it possible to explore the mutability of international 
relations, against the dogmas of anarchy and its implications. 
Second, it mobilises one of the best methodological contributions of the 
practice and relational turns: ethnographically sensitive ‘practice mapping’ (Pouliot 
2014) to identify normativity even when there are no easily identifiable ‘norms’. Here 
the de-reification phrase of the proposed analytical process is especially valuable. 
Investigations into semi-secret institutions, such government security agencies or 
corporations concerned about proprietary industrial practices, or into culturally alien 
social spaces (either domestic or foreign) are most likely to present initial difficulties 
to researchers looking for ‘norms’, but by instead looking for normative 
configurations, it becomes easier to develop and ontologically coherent picture of 
regulation and valuation. It allows for the investigation of normativity without 
needing to know of, or refer to, some correlate ‘norm’, sidestepping data gaps and 
possible debates on whether a norm exists rather than on whether something 
normative exists. Put differently, the theory of normative transformation I advance 
here is ontologically consistent with the practice turn but offers a set of concepts 
and commitments more sensitive to making sense of normativity than those 
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currently available in practice theories of international relations. It maintains 
normativity as something specific, with its own language of ethics, imperatives, and 
value, even if studying normativity may involve the tracing of changes in practices 
and communities thereof.11 
Finally, it expands the vocabulary available to scholars in these to turns for 
studying more delimited episodes of institutional or practice transformation where 
there is clearly some significant regulatory or evaluative change, occurring rapidly 
yet not oriented around something they want to call a ‘norm’, both for ontological 
reasons and perhaps because actors themselves do not seem to conceive of it in that 
way. There are cases where part of the normative transformation taking place is not 
in what standards, values, or principles should apply to a situation, but in what 
counts as conforming to them. The cases of targeted killing, torture, and armed 
contractors, already discussed in the introduction, are examples of these. 
Contestation over definitions were part of what happened, but processes of 
practitioner-driven problem-solving, organisational change, and technical 
innovation feature in them as well, in ways that extend beyond discourse. They show 
changed understandings of what counts as a competent performance, as interests 
practice theorists (Adler and Pouliot 2011), in but in ways that require an analytical 
language specifically designed to explore the dimensions of rightness, propriety, and 
value in action—in other words, in ways that require us to talk of normativity as 
such, without reifying it into social objects or dissolving it into a more general theory 
of practice. 
 
Conclusion 
The pragmatist and relational theory of normative transformation I propose here 
offers both analytical and metatheoretical benefits. It makes it easier to study rapid 
institutional change, and offers an expanded vocabulary to those in the practice and 
relational turn for making sense of normativity while remaining loyal to the basic 
premises of their approaches. This should advance the overall constructivist project 
 
11 By contrast, if norms and normativity are completely redefined as practices or communities of 
practice, then the distinctive theoretical purpose of talking about norms in the first place, as I 
discuss earlier, is lost. 
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in the field, in ways that sustain and continue a long-standing interest in norms and 
normativity, but speak to emerging disciplinary shifts in social ontology and 
methodology. 
 In the discipline of IR, constructivism has largely been a critical response to 
dereification (McCourt 2016), and the turns towards practices and relations sustain 
that critique even as older constructivist work itself becomes a critical target. While 
the bulk of practice/relational turn scholars and norms scholars alike have been 
focused on issues of diplomacy and security, the approach to theorising normativity 
I propose here may help broaden the horizons of both research communities. One 
particular way is by equipping both with new tools for studying climate governance 
and other initiatives to grapple with the implications of climate change (Hoffmann 
2011), which involve the revision of a host of identities, values, and institutions, and 
knit together a range of interests and actors to confront an unprecedented global 
threat.   
 Another way my proposed approach may contribute empirical value, as 
noted in the introduction, is to help scholars respond to the rapid, multifaceted 
transformations occurring, or threatening to occur, in previously stable liberal-
democratic institutions, ranging from the domestic to the international. Often not 
expressly oriented around norm entrepreneurship but nevertheless entailing 
significant normative change, political parties and campaigns across ‘the West’ 
employ a host of methods and discourses designed to revise dominant practices and 
interpretations of human rights, sovereignty, national identity, and citizenship. 
Appreciating how these insurgents act, and responding to the threats they pose (for 
those who find them threatening), is aided by the intellectual tools supplied by the 
philosophical and sociological approaches I draw upon here, and the de-reified 
conception of normativity and change they disclose. In other words, this essay does 
not merely respond to a disciplinary puzzle, but also a pressing political problem. 
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